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Abstract—Geosocial networks are online social networks cen-
tered on the locations of subscribers and businesses. Providing
input to targeted advertising, profiling social network users
becomes an important source of revenue. Its natural reliance
on personal information introduces a trade-off between user
privacy and incentives of participation for businesses and geoso-
cial network providers. In this paper we introduce location
centric profiles (LCPs), aggregates built over the profiles of users
present at a given location. We introduce PROFILR , a suite
of mechanisms that construct LCPs in a private and correct
manner. We introduce iSafe, a novel, context aware public safety
application built on PROFILR . Our Android and browser plugin
implementations show that PROFILR is efficient: the end-to-end
overhead is small even under strong correctness assurances.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks have become a significant source of
personal information. Facebook alone is used by more than
1 out of 8 people today. Social network users voluntarily
reveal a wealth of personal data, including age, gender, contact
information, preferences and status updates. A recent addition
to this space, geosocial networks (GSNs) such as Yelp [1],
Foursquare [2] or Facebook Places [3], further provide access
even to personal locations, through check-ins performed by
users at visited venues.
From the user perspective, personal information allows
GSN providers to offer targeted advertising and venue own-
ers to promote their business through spatio-temporal incen-
tives (e.g., rewarding frequent customers through accumulated
badges). The profitability of social network providers and
participating businesses rests on their ability to collect, build
and capitalize upon customer and venue profiles. Profiles
are built based on user information – the more detailed the
better. Providing personal information exposes however users
to significant risks, as social networks have been shown to
leak [4] and even sell [5] user data to third parties. Conversely,
from the provider and business perspective, being denied
access to user information discourages participation. There
exists therefore a conflict between the needs of users and those
of providers and participating businesses: Without privacy
people may be reluctant to use geosocial networks, without
feedback the provider and businesses have no incentive to
participate.
In this paper we take first steps toward breaking this dead-
lock, by introducing the concept of location centric profiles
(LCPs). LCPs are aggregate statistics built from the profiles
of (i) users that have visited a certain location or (ii) a set of
co-located users.
We introduce PROFILR , a framework that allows the
construction of LCPs based on the profiles of present users,
while ensuring the privacy and correctness of participants.
Informally, we define privacy as the inability of venues and the
GSN provider to accurately learn user information, including
even anonymized location trace profiles. Thus, location privacy
is an inherent PROFILR requirement.
Correctness is a by-product of privacy: under the cover
of privacy users may try to bias LCPs. We consider two
correctness components (i) location correctness – users can
only contribute to LCPs of venues where they are located and
(ii) LCP correctness – users can modify LCPs only in a pre-
defined manner. Location correctness is an issue of particular
concern. The use of financial incentives by venues to reward
frequent geosocial network customers, has generated a surge of
fake check-ins [6]. Even with GPS verification mechanisms in
place, committing location fraud has been largely simplified by
the recent emergence of specialized applications for the most
popular mobile eco-systems (LocationSpoofer [7] for iPhone
and GPSCheat [8] for Android).
We propose first a venue centric PROFILR . To relieve the
GSN provider from a costly involvement in venue specific
activities, PROFILR stores and builds LCPs at venues. Partic-
ipating venue owners need to deploy an inexpensive device
inside their business, allowing them to perform LCP related
activities and verify the physical presence of participating
users. We extend PROFILR with the notion of snapshot LCPs,
built by user devices from the profiles of co-located users,
communicated over ad hoc wireless connections. Snapshot
LCPs are not bound to venues, but instead user devices
can compute LCPs of neighbors at any location of interest.
PROFILR relies on (Benaloh’s) homomorphic cryptosystem
and zero knowledge proofs to enable oblivious and provable
correct LCP computations.
We further introduce iSafe, a context aware safety appli-
cation, that uses PROFILR to privately build safety LCPs.
The constant population density increase, and the recent surge
of natural and man-made disasters, riots and lootings, make
safety aware applications of paramount importance. The goal
of iSafe is to make users aware of the safety of their sur-
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Fig. 1. Yelp venue stats: (a) Distribution of the number of Yelp reviews per
venue. (b) Distribution of the distance from the venue “Ike’s Place” to the
home cities of its reviewers.
roundings while preserving the privacy of participants. Safety
information can empower a suite of applications, including
safe walking/evacuation directions and safety dependent mo-
bile authentication.
We implemented iSafe and PROFILR as mobile application
and browser plugin components. Our experiments show that
on a smartphone, with a client cheating probability of 1 in a
million, the end-to-end overhead of an LCP update operation is
2.5s. We further rely on data collected from Yelp [1], a popular
geosocial network, to build user and venue safety labels. The
iSafe browser plugin introduces an overhead of under 1s for
collecting and processing 500 Yelp reviews.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the system and adversary model and defines the problem.
Section III introduces PROFILR and proves its privacy and
correctness. Section IV introduces snapshot LCPs and presents
the distributed, real-time variant of PROFILR . Section V intro-
duces iSafe and its implementation. Section VI evaluates the
performance of the proposed constructs. Section VII describes
related work and Section VIII concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND MODEL
We model the geosocial network (GSN) after Yelp [1].
It consists of a provider, S, hosting the system along with
information about registered venues, and serving a number of
subscribers. To use the provider’s services, a client application
needs to be downloaded and installed. Users register and
receive initial service credentials, including a unique user id.
We use the terms subscriber and user interchangeably to refer
to users of the service and the term client to denote the
software provided by the service and installed by users on
their devices.
The provider supports a set of businesses or venues, with an
associated geographic location (e.g., restaurants, yoga classes,
towing companies, etc). Users are encouraged to write reviews
for visited locations, as well as report their location, through
check-ins at venues where they are present.
Participating venue owners need to install inexpensive
equipment (e.g., a $25 Raspberry PI [9], a BeagleBoard or
any Android smartphone). Such equipment can also be used
for other tasks including detecting fake user check-ins [10] and
preventing fake badges and incorrect rewards, and validating
social network (e.g., Yelp [1]) reviews, thus eliminating fake
negative reviews. The advantages provided by such solutions
can motivate the small investment.
We have collected data from 16,199 venues throughout the
U.S.. Besides the name, location and type of venue, we have
also collected all the reviews provided for these venues, for a
total of 1,096,044 reviews. For each review we extracted the
reviewer id, the date the review was written and the number
of check-ins performed. Moreover, we have collected data
from 10,031 Yelp users, including their id, location, number
of friends and reviews, for a total of 646,017 reviews. Figure
1(a) shows the long-tail distribution of the number of reviews
per venue, for the collected venues.
A. Location Centric Profiles
Each user has a profile PU = {u1, u2, .., ud}, consisting
of values on d dimensions (e.g., age, gender, home city, etc).
Each dimension has a range, or a set of possible values. Given
a set of users U at location L, the location centric profile
at L, denoted by LCP (L) is the set {S1, S2, .., Sd}, where
Si denotes the aggregate statistics over the i-th dimension of
profiles of users from U .
In the following, we focus on a single profile dimension,
D. We assume D takes values over a range R that can
be discretized into a finite set of sub-intervals (e.g., set of
continuous disjoint intervals or discrete values). Then, given
an integer b, chosen to be dimension specific, we divide R into
b intervals/sets, R1, .., Rb. For instance, gender maps naturally
to discrete values (b = 2), while age can be divided into
disjoint sub-intervals, with a higher b value. We define the
aggregate statistics S for dimension D of LCP (L) to consist
of b counters c1, .., ck; ci records the number of users from
U whose profile value on dimension D falls within range Ri,
i = 1..b.
Figure 1(b) illustrates an LCP dimension: the distribution of
the (great-circle) distance in miles from a venue (“Ike’s Place”
in San Francisco, CA) and the home cities of its (4000+)
reviewers. Note that more than 3000 reviews were left by
locals, information that can be used by the venue to better
cater to its customers.
B. Private LCP Requirements
We define a private LCP solution to be a set of func-
tions, PP (k) = {Setup, Spoter, CheckIn, PubStats}, see
Figure 2. Setup is run by each venue where user statistics
are collected, to generate parameters for user check-ins. To
perform a check-in, a user first runs Spoter, to prove her
physical presence at the venue. Spoter returns error if the
verification fails, success otherwise. If Spoter is successful,
CheckIn is run between the user and the venue, and allows
the collection of profile information from the user. Specifically,
if the user’s profile value v on dimension D falls within
the range Ri, the counter ci is incremented by 1. Finally,
PubStats publishes collected LCPs.
Let CV be the set of counters defined at a venue V . Let C¯V
denote the set of b sets of counters derived from CV , such that
3Fig. 2. Solution architecture (k=2). The red arrows denote anonymous
communication channels, whereas black arrows indicate authenticated (and
secure) communication channels.
each set in C¯V has exactly one counter incremented over the
set CV . A private LCP solution needs to satisfy the following
properties:
Location Correctness: Let A denote an adversary that con-
trols the GSN provider and any number of users. Let C be
a challenger that controls a venue V . A running as a user
U not present at V , has negligible probability to successfully
complete Spoter at V .
LCP Correctness: Let A denote an adversary that controls the
GSN provider and any number of users. Let C be a challenger
that controls a venue V . Let CV denote the set of counters
at V before A runs CheckIn at V and let C′V be the set
of counters afterward. If C′V /∈ C¯V , the CheckIn completes
successfully with only negligible probability.
k-Privacy: Let A denote an adversary that controls any
number of venues and let C denote a challenger controlling
k users. C runs Spoter followed by CheckIn at a venue V
controlled by A on behalf of i < k users. Let Ci denote the
resulting counter set. For each j = 1..b, A outputs c′j , its
guess of the value of the j-th counter of Ci. The advantage of
A, Adv(A) = |Pr[Ci[j] = c′j ]− 1/(i + 1)|, defined for each
j = 1..b, is negligible.
Check-In Indistinguishability (CI-IND): Let a challenger C
control two users U0 and U1 and let an adversary A control
any number of venues. A generates randomly q bits, b1, .., bq,
and sends them to C. For each bit bi, i = 1..q, C runs Spoter
followed by CheckIn on behalf of user Ubi . At the end of
this step, C generates a random bit b and runs Spoter followed
by CheckIn on behalf of Ub at a venue not used before. A
outputs a bit b′, its guess of b. The advantage of A, Adv(A) =
|Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2| is negligible.
C. Attacker Model
We assume venue owners are malicious and will attempt to
learn private information from subscribers. Clients installed by
users can be malicious, attempting to bias LCPs constructed at
target venues. We assume the GSN provider does not collude
with venues, but will try to learn private user information.
D. Cryptographic Tools
Homomorphic Cryptosystems. We use the Benaloh cryp-
tosystem [11], an extension of the Goldwasser-Micali [12].
It consists of three functions (K,E,D), defined as follows:
• K(k) - key generation: k, an odd integer, is the size of the
input block. Select two large primes p and q such that k|(p−1)
and gcd(k, (p−1)/k) = 1 and gcd(k, q−1) = 1. Let n = pq.
Select y ∈ Z∗n, such that y(p−1)(q−1)/k mod n 6= 1. n and y
are the public key and p and q are the private key.
• E(u,m): Encrypt message m ∈ Z∗k, using a randomly
chosen value u ∈ Z∗n. Output ymuk mod n.
• D(z): Decrypt ciphertext z. Let z = ymuk mod n. If
z(p−1)(q−1)/r = 1, then return m = 0. Otherwise, for i = 1..k,
compute si = y−iz mod n. If si = 1, return m = i.
Benaloh’s cryptosystem is additively homomorphic:
E(u1,m1)E(u2,m2) = E(u1u2,m1+m2). We further define
the re-encryption function RE(v, E(u,m)) to be ymukvk =
E(uv,m). Note that the re-encryption function can be invoked
without knowledge of the message m. Furthermore, it is
possible to show that two ciphertexts are the encryption
of the same plaintext, without revealing the plaintext. That
is, given E(u,m) and E(v,m), reveal w = u−1v. Then,
E(v,m) = RE(w,E(u,m)).
Anonymizers. We use an anonymizer[13], [14], [15], [16] that
(i) operates correctly – the output corresponds to a permutation
of the input and (ii) provides privacy – an observer is unable to
determine which input element corresponds to a given output
element in any way better than guessing. In the following we
denote the anonymizer by Mix.
Secret Sharing. Our constructions use a (k, n) threshold
secret sharing (TSS) [17] solution. Given a value R, TSS
generates n shares such that at least k shares are needed to
reconstruct R. A (k, n)-TSS solution satisfies the property of
hiding: An adversary (provided with access to a TSS oracle)
controlling the choice of two values R0 and R1 and given less
than k shares of Rb, b ∈R {0, 1}, can guess the value of b
with probability only negligible higher than 1/2.
III. PROFILR
Let SPOTRV denote the device installed at venue V . For
each user profile dimension D, SPOTRV stores a set of
encrypted counters – one for each sub-range of R.
Solution overview: Initially, and following each cycle
of k check-ins executed at venue V , SPOTRV initiates Setup,
to request the provider S to generate a new Benaloh key pair.
Thus, at each venue time is partitioned into cycles: a cycle
completes once k users have checked-in at the venue. The
communication during Setup takes place over an authenticated
and secure channel (see Figure 2).
When a user U checks-in at venue V , it first engages in the
Spoter protocol with SPOTRV . As shown in Figure 2, this
step is performed over an anonymous channel, to preserve
the user’s (location) privacy. Spoter allows the venue to
verify U ’s physical presence through a challenge/response
protocol between SPOTRV and the user device. Furthermore, a
4successful run of Spoter provides U with a share of the secret
key employed in the Benaloh cryptosystem of the current
cycle. For each venue and user profile dimension, S stores
a set Sh of shares of the secret key that have been revealed
so far.
Subsequently, U runs CheckIn with SPOTRV , to send its
share of the secret key and to receive the encrypted counter
sets. As shown in Figure 2, the communication takes place
over an anonymous channel to preserve U ’s privacy. During
CheckIn, for each dimension D, U increments the counter
corresponding to her range, re-encrypts all counters and sends
the resulting set to SPOTRV . U and SPOTRV engage in a
zero knowledge protocol that allows SPOTRV to verify U ’s
correct behavior: exactly one counter has been incremented.
SPOTRV stores the latest, proved to be correct encrypted
counter set, and inserts the secret key share into the set Sh.
Once k users successfully complete the CheckIn proce-
dure, marking the end of a cycle, SPOTRV runs PubStats to
reconstruct the private key, decrypt all encrypted counters and
publish the tally. The communication during PubStats takes
place over an authenticated channel (see Figure 2).
A. The Solution
Let Ci denote the set of encrypted counters at V , following
the i-th user run of CheckIn. Ci = {Ci[1], .., Ci[b]}, where
Ci[j] denotes the encrypted counter corresponding to Rj , the
j-th sub-range of R. We write Ci[j] = E(uj , u′j, cj , j) =
[E(uj , cj), E(u
′
j , j)], where uj and u′j are random obfuscating
factors and E(u,m) denotes the Benaloh encryption of mes-
sage m using random factor u. That is, an encrypted counter
is stored for each sub-range of domain R of dimension D.
The encrypted counter consists of two records, encoding the
number of users whose values on dimension D fall within a
particular sub-range of R.
Let RE(vj , v′j , E(uj , u′j , cj, j) denote the re-encryption of
the j-th record with two random values vj and v′j :
RE(vj , v
′
j , E(uj , u
′
j , cj, j)) = [RE(vj , E(uj , cj)),
RE(v′j , E(u
′
j , j))] = [E(ujvj , cj), E(u
′
jv
′
j , j)]. Let
Ci[j] + + = E(uj , u
′
j , cj + 1, j) denote the encryption
of the incremented j-th counter. Note that incrementing the
counter can be done without decrypting Ci[j] or knowing the
current counter’s value: Ci[j] + + = [E(uj , cj)y, E(u′j , j)] =
[ycj+1urj , E(u
′
j , j)] = [E(uj , cj + 1), E(u
′
j , j)].
In the following we use the above definitions to introduce
PROFILR . PROFILR instantiates PP (k), where k is the pri-
vacy parameter. The notation P (A(paramsA), B(paramsB))
denotes the fact that protocol P involves participants A and
B, each with its own parameters.
Setup(V(),S(k)):: The provider S runs the key generation
function K(k) of the Benaloh cryptosystem (see Section II-D).
Let p and q be the private key and n and y the public key.
S sends the public key to SPOTRV . SPOTRV generates a
signature key pair and registers the public key with S. For
each user profile dimension D of range R, SPOTRV performs
the following steps:
• Initialize counters c1, .., cb to 0. b is the number of R’s
sub-ranges.
• Generate C0 = {E(x1, x′1, c1, 1), .., E(xb, x′b, cb, b)},
where xi, x′i, i = 1..b are randomly chosen values. Store C0
indexed on dimension D.
• Initialize the share set Skey = ∅.
Spoter(U(K),V(),S(k)):: U sets up an anonymous con-
nection with SPOTRV , e.g., by using fresh, random MAC
and IP address values. SPOTRV initiates a challenge/response
protocol, by sending to U the currently sampled time T , an
expiration interval ∆T and a fresh random value R. The
user’s device generates a hash of these values and sends the
result back to SPOTRV . SPOTRV ensures that the response
is received within a specific interval from the challenge (see
Section VI for values and discussion). If the verification
succeeds, SPOTRV uses its private key to sign a timestamped
token and sends the result to U . U contacts S over Mix and
sends the token signed by SPOTRV . S verifies V ’s signature
as well as the freshness (and single use) of the token. Let U
be the i-th user checking-in at V . If the verifications pass and
i ≤ k, S uses the (k, n) TSS to compute a share of p (Benaloh
secret key, factor of the modulus n). Let pi be the share of p.
S sends the (signed) share pi to U . If i > k, S calls Setup
to generate new parameters for V .
CheckIn(U(pi, n, V), V(n, y, Ci−1, Skey)): : U uses
the same random MAC and IP addresses as in the previous
Spoter run. Executes only if the previous run of Spoter is
successful. Let U be the i-th user checking-in at V . Then,
Ci−1 is the current set of encrypted counters. SPOTRV sends
Ci−1 to U . Let v, U ’s value on dimension D, be within R’s
j-th sub-range, i.e., v ∈ Rj . U runs the following steps:
• Generate b pairs of random values {(v1, v′1), .., (vb, v′b)}.
Compute the new encrypted counter set Ci, where the order
of the counters in Ci is identical to Ci−1: Ci =
{RE(vl, v
′
l, Ci−1[l])|l = 1..b, l 6= j} ∪ RE(vj , v
′
j , Ci−1[j] +
+).
• Send Ci along with the signed (by S) share pi of the private
key p to V .
If SPOTRV successfully verifies the signature of S on the share
pi, U and SPOTRV engage in a zero knowledge protocol ZK-
CTR (see Section III-B). ZK-CTR allows U to prove that Ci
is a correct re-encryption of Ci−1: only one counter of Ci−1
has been incremented. If the proof verifies, SPOTRV replaces
Ci−1 with Ci and ads the share pi to the set Skey .
PubStats(V(Ck,Sh,V),S(p,q)): : SPOTRV performs the
following actions:
• If |Sh| < k, abort.
• If |Sh| = k, use the k shares to reconstruct p, the private
Benaloh key.
• Use p and q = n/p to decrypt each record in Ck, the final
set of counters at V . Publish results.
B. ZK-CTR: Proof of Correctness
We now present the zero knowledge proof of the set Ci
being a correct re-encryption of the set Ci−1, i.e., a single
5counter has been incremented. Let ZK-CTR(i) denote the
protocol run for sets Ci−1 and Ci. U and SPOTRV run the
following steps s times:
• U generates random values (t1, t′1), .., (tb, t′b) and random
permutation π, then sends to SPOTRV the proof set Pi−1 =
π{RE(tl, t′l, Ci−1[l]), l = 1..b}.
• U generates random values (w1, w′1), .., (wb, w′b), then
sends to SPOTRV the proof set Pi = π{RE(wl, w′l, Ci[l]), l =
1..b}
• SPOTRV generates a random bit a and sends it to U .
• If a = 0, U reveals random values (t1, t′1), .., (tb, t′b) and
(w1, w
′
1), .., (wb, w
′
b). SPOTRV verifies that for each l = 1..b,
RE(tl, t
′
l, Ci−1[l]) occurs in Pi−1 exactly once, and that for
each l = 1..b, RE(wl, w′l, Ci[l]) occurs in Pi exactly once.
• If a = 1, U reveals ol = vlwlt−1l and o′l = v′lw′lt
′−1
l , for all
l = 1..b along with j, the position in Pi−1 and Pi of the incre-
mented counter. SPOTRV verifies that for all l = 1..b, l 6= j,
RE(ol, o
′
l, Pi−1[l]) = Pi[l] and RE(oj , o′j , Pi−1[j]y) = Pi[j].
• If any verification fails, SPOTRV aborts the protocol.
C. Preventing Illegal Votes
For simplicity of presentation, we have avoided the Sybil at-
tack problem: participants that cheat through multiple accounts
they control or by exploiting the anonymizer. For instance,
a rogue venue owner, controlling k-1 Sybil user accounts
or simulating k-1 check-ins, can use PROFILR to reveal the
profile of a real user. Conversely, a rogue user (including the
venue) could bias the statistics built by the venue (and even
deny service) by checking-in multiple times in a short interval.
Sybil detection techniques (see Section VII) can be used
to control the number of fake, Sybil accounts. However, the
use of the anonymizer prevents the provider and the use of
the unique IP and MAC addresses prevents the venue from
differentiating between interactions with the same or different
accounts. In this section we propose a solution, that when
used in conjunction with Sybil detection tools, mitigates this
problem. The solution introduces a trade-off between privacy
and security.
Specifically, we divide time into epochs (e.g., one day long).
A user can check-in at any venue at most once per epoch.
When active, once per epoch e, each user U contacts the
provider S over an authenticated channel. U and S run a
blind signature [18] protocol: U obtains the signature of S
on a random value, RU,e. S does not sign more than one
value for U for any epoch. In runs of Spoter and CheckIn
during epoch e, U uses RU,e as its pseudonym (i.e., MAC and
IP address). Venues can verify the validity of the pseudonym
using S’s signature. A venue accepts a single CheckIn per
epoch from any pseudonym, thus limiting the user’s impact
on the LCP.
D. Analysis
Given a set of encrypted counters C, let C¯ denote the set
of re-encryptions of records of C, where only one record has
its counter incremented. We introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 1: ZK-CTR(i) is a ZK proof of Ci ∈ C¯i−1.
Proof: We need to prove completeness, soundness and
zero-knowledge. For completeness, if Ci ∈ C¯i−1, in each of the
s steps, U succeeds to convince S, irrespective of the challenge
bit a. If a = 0, U can produce the random obfuscating values
proving that the proof sets Pi−1 and Pi are correctly generated
from Ci−1 and Ci. If a = 1, U can build the obfuscating
factors proving that Pi ∈ P¯i−1.
For soundness, we need to prove that if Ci /∈ C¯i−1, U cannot
convince S unless with negligible probability. For simplicity
reasons, we assume Ci /∈ C¯i−1 due to a single record in
Ci being “bad”: Ci−1[j] = E(uj , u′j, cj , j) and Ci[j] =
E(vj , v
′
j , c
′
j , j
′). In any round of the ZK-CTR protocol, U has
two options for cheating. First, U could count on the bit a
to come up 0. Then, U builds Pi−1[j] = E(ujtj , u′jt′j , cj , j)
and Pi[j] = E(vjwj , v′jw′j , c′j , j′). If however a = 1, U has
to come up with a value αj , such that RE(αj , E(uj , cj) =
E(v′j , c
′
j) or RE(αj , E(uj , cj + 1) = E(v
′
j , c
′
j). In the first
case, this means ycj (ujαj)k = yc′
j
v′kj mod n. Without know-
ing n’s factorization, U cannot compute k’s inverse modulo
φ(n). Then, the equation is satisfied only if c′j = cj + zk, for
an integer z. Note however that Benaloh’s cryptosystem only
works for values in Z∗k, making this condition impossible to
satisfy. The second case is similar. The second cheating option
is to assume a will be 1 and build Pi[j] to be a re-encryption
of Pi−1[j]. It is then straightforward to see that if a = 0, U
can only succeed in convincing S, if c′j = cj + zk, which we
have shown is impossible for z 6= 0. Thus, in each round, U
can only cheat with probability 1/2. Following s rounds, this
probability becomes 1/2s.
We now show that ZK-CTR conveys no knowledge to any
verifier, even one that deviates arbitrarily from the protocol.
We prove this by following the approach from [19], [20].
Specifically, let S∗ be an arbitrary, fixed, expected polynomial
time ITM. We generate an expected polynomial time machine
M∗ that, without being given access to the client, produces
an output whose probability distribution is identical to the
probability distribution of the output of < C,S∗ >.
We now build M∗ that uses S∗ as a black box many times.
Whenever M∗ invokes S∗, it places input x = (L0, L1) on
its input tape ITS and a fixed sequence of random bits on
its random tape, RTS . The input x consists of L0 = C0 and
L1 = C1. The content of the input communication tape for
S∗, CTS will consist of tuples (P2i, P2i+1, πi), where P2i
and P2i+1 are sets and πi is a permutation. The output of M∗
consists of two tapes: the random-record tape RTM and the
communication-record tape CTM . RTM contains the prefix of
the random bit string r read by S∗. The machine M∗ works
as follows (round i):
Step 1 M∗ chooses a random bit a ∈R {0, 1}. If a = 0, M∗
picks a random permutation πi, generates tl, t′l, l = 1..b ran-
domly and computes P2i = πi{RE(tl, t′l, Ci−1[l]), l = 1..b}.
It then generates random values wl, w′l, l = 1..b, randomly and
computes the set P2i+1 = πi{RE(wl, w′l, Ci[l]), l = 1..b}.
Note that M∗ does not need to know the counters to perform
this operation. If a = 1, M∗ generates a random set P2i,
then generates random values ol, o′l randomly, l = 1..b. It then
6generates a random j ∈ 1..b and computes P2i+1 such that for
all l = 1..b, l 6= j, RE(ol, o′l, P2i[l]) = P2i+1[l] and for the
j-th position, RE(oj , o′j , P2i[j]y) = P2i+1[j].
Step 2 M∗ sets
b = S∗(x, r;P0, P1, π0, .., P2i−2, P2i−1, πi−1, P2i, P2i+1).
That is, b is the output of S∗ on input x and random string
r after receiving i− 1 pairs P2j , P2j+1, πj), j = 1..i− 1 and
proof P2i, P2i+1 on its communication tape CTS . We have the
following three cases.
(Case 1). a = b = 0. M∗ can produce tl, t′l, wl, w′l, l = 1..b
and πi to prove that P2i = πi{RE(tl, t′l, Ci−1[l]), l = 1..b}
and P2i+1 = πi{RE(wl, w′l, Ci[l]), l = 1..b}. M∗ sets bi to
b, appends the tuple (P2i, P2i+1, πi, bi) to CTM and proceeds
to the next round (i+1).
(Case 2). a = b = 1. M∗ can produce ol, o′l, l = 1..b, and
index j such that RE(ol, o′l, P2i[l]) = P2i+1[l], l = 1..b, l 6= j
and RE(oj , o′j , P2i[j]y) = P2i+1[j]. M∗ sets bi to b, appends
the tuple (P2i, P2i+1, πi, bi) to CTM and proceeds to the next
round (i+1).
(Case 3). a 6= b. M∗ discards all the values of the current
iteration and repeats the current round (Step 1 and 2).
If all rounds are completed, M∗ halts and outputs
(x, r′, CTM ), where r′ is the prefix of the random bits r
scanned by S∗ on input x. We first prove that M∗ terminates in
expected polynomial time and then that the output distribution
of M∗ is the same as the output distribution of S∗ when
interacting with the client, on input (L0, L1).
Lemma 1: M∗ terminates in expected polynomial time.
Proof: Given C0 and C1, during the i-th round P2i and
P2i+1 are either built from C0 and C1 or from each other. Dur-
ing each run of round i, the bit a is chosen independently. Then
P2i and P2i+1 are also chosen independently. This implies that
the probability that a = b is 1/2 and the expected number of
repetitions of round i is 2. S∗ is expected polynomial time,
which implies that M∗ is also polynomial time.
Lemma 2: The probability distribution of < C,S∗ >
(L0, L− 1) > and of M∗(L0, L1) are identical.
Proof: The output of < C,S∗ > (L0, L1) > and of
M∗(L0, L1) consists of a sequence of t tuples of format
(P2i, P2i+1, πi, bi). Let Π
(x,r,i)
M∗ and Π
(x,r,i)
CS∗ be the proba-
bility distributions of the first i tuples output by M∗ and
< C,S∗ >. We need to show that for any fixed random input
r, Π
(x,r,t)
M∗ = Π
(x,r,t)
CS∗ . We prove this by induction. The base
case, where i = 0, holds immediately. In the induction step
we assume that Π(x,r,i)M∗ = Π
(x,r,i)
CS∗ = T
(i)
. We need to prove
that the i + 1st tuples in Π(x,r,i+1)M∗ , denoted by Π
(i+1)
M∗ and
in Π(x,r,i+1)CS∗ , denoted by Π
(i+1)
CS∗ have the same distribution.
We show that Π(i+1)M∗ and Π
(i+1)
CS∗ are uniform over the set
V = {(P2i, P2i+1, πi, b)|b = S
∗(x, r, T (i)||P ) ∧ ((P2i =
πiRE(C0), P2i+1 = πiRE(C1), if b = 0) ∨ (P2i+1[l] =
RE(P2i[l]), l = 1..b, l 6= j, P2i+1[j] = yRE(P2i[j]), if b =
1)}. For Π(i+1)CS∗ , this is the case, by construction. If Π
(i+1)
M∗
has output, it is also uniformly distributed in V .
M∗ terminates in expected polynomial time and its output
has the same distribution as the output of the interaction
between S∗ and a client. Thus, the theorem follows.
We can now prove the following results.
Theorem 2: PROFILR is k-private.
Proof: (Sketch) Following the definition from Sec-
tion II-B, let us assume that the adversary A has access to
an encrypted counter set Ci generated after C has run Spoter
followed by CheckIn on behalf of i < k different users. The
records of set Ci are encrypted and A has i shares of the
private key. For any j = 1..b, let c′j be A’s guess of the value
of the j-th counter in Ci. If |Pr[Ci[j] = c′j ]−1/(k+1)| = ǫ is
non-negligible we can use A to construct an adversary B that
has ǫ advantage in the (i) semantic security game of Benaloh
or in the (ii) hiding game of the (k, n) TSS. We start with
the first reduction. B generates two messages M0 = 0 and
M1 = 1 and sends them to the challenger C. C picks a bit
d ∈R {0, 1} and sends to B the value E(u,Md), where u
is random and E denotes Benaloh’s encryption function. B
initiates a new game with A, with counters set to 0. B runs
Spoter and CheckIn (acting as challenger) with A. B re-
encrypts all counters from A, except the j-th one, which it
replaces with E(u,Md). B runs ZK-CTR with A (used as a
black box) a polynomial number of times until it succeeds.
A outputs its guess of the values of all counters. B sends the
guess for the j-th counter to C. The advantage of B in this
game comes entirely from the advantage provided by A.
For the second reduction, B runs Setup as the provider and
obtains the secret key p0 and p1 (renamed from p and q).
B sends p0 and p1 to the challenger C, as its choice of two
random values. C generates a random bit a, uses the (k, n) TSS
to generate i < k shares of pa, sh1, .., shi, and sends them to
B. B generates a new random prime q and picks randomly a
bit d. Let the Benaloh modulus be n = pdq. Then, acting as i
different users, Uj , j = 1..i B runs Spoter with S (which it
also controls) to obtain S’s signature on shj . For each of the
i users, B runs CheckIn with A. At the end of the process,
A outputs its guess of the encrypted counters. If the guess is
correct on more than d/(j + 1) counters, B sends d to C as
its guess for a. Otherwise, it sends d¯. Thus, B’s advantage in
the hiding game of TSS is equivalent to A’s advantage against
PROFILR .
Theorem 3: PROFILR ensures location correctness.
Proof: The user’s location is verified in the Spoter
protocol. A single malicious user, not present at venue V ,
is unable to establish a connection with the device deployed
at V , SPOTRV . Thus, the user is unable to participate in the
challenge/response protocol and receive at its completion a
provider signed share of the Benaloh secret key. Without the
share, the user is unable to initiate the CheckIn protocol. Two
(or more) attackers can launch wormhole attacks: one attacker
present at V , acts a a proxy and relays information between
SPOTRV and a remote attacker. This may allow the remote
attacker to successfully run Spoter and CheckIn at V . In
Section VI we present experimental proof that Spoter detects
wormhole attacks.
Theorem 4: PROFILR is LCP correct.
7Proof: (Sketch) A user U can alter the LCP of a venue V
in two ways. First, during the ZK-CTR protocol, it modifies
more than one counter or corrupts (at least ) one counter.
The soundness property of ZK-CTR, proved in Theorem 1
shows this attack succeeds with probability 1/2s. Second,
it attempts to prevent V from decrypting the counter sets
after k users have run CheckIn. This can be done by pre-
venting SPOTRV from reconstructing the private Benaloh key.
Key shares are however signed by the provider, allowing
SPOTRV to detect invalid shares.
Theorem 5: PROFILR provides CI-IND.
Proof: (Sketch) Let A be an adversary that has an ǫ
advantage in the CI-IND game. We assume the challenger does
not run Spoter and CheckIn twice for the same (user, epoch)
pair – otherwise the use of the signed pseudonyms provides
an advantage to A. Note that if pseudonyms are not used,
this requirement is not necessary. Moreover, no identifying
information is sent by users during Spoter and CheckIn: the
pseudonyms are blindly signed by S, and all communication
with S takes places over Mix.
IV. SNAPSHOT LCP
We extend PROFILR to allow not only venues but also users
to collect snapshot LCPs of other, co-located users. To achieve
this, we take advantage of the ability of most modern mobile
devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets) to setup ad hoc networks.
Devices establish local connections with neighboring devices
and privately compute the instantaneous aggregate LCP of
their profiles.
A. Snapshot PROFILR
We assume a user U co-located with k other users U1, .., Uk.
U needs to generate the LCP of their profiles, without in-
frastructure, GSN provider or venue support. An additional
difficulty then, is that participating users need assurances
that their profiles will not be revealed to U . However,
one advantage of this setup is that location verification
is not needed: U intrinsically determines co-location with
U1, .., Uk. Snapshot PROFILR consists of three protocols,
{Setup, LCPGen, PubStats}:
Setup(U(r), U1, .., Uk()): : U performs the following
steps:
• Run the key generation function K(r) of the Benaloh
cryptosystem (see Section II-D). Send the public key n and y
to each user U1, .., Uk.
• Engage in a multi-party secure function evaluation proto-
col [21], [22] with U1, .., Uk to generate shares of a public
value R < n. At the end of the protocol, each user Ui has a
share Ri, such that R1..Rk = R mod n and Ri is only known
to Ui.
• Assign each of the k users a unique label between 1 and
k. Let U1, .., Uk denote this order.
• Generate C0 = {E(x1, x′1, 0, 1), .., E(xb, x′b, 0, b)}, where
xi, x
′
i, i = 1..b are randomly chosen. Store C0 indexed on
dimension D.
Fig. 3. Static crime indexes computed over crimes reported during 2010 in
the Miami-Dade county.
Each of the k users engages in a 1-on-1 LCPGen with U to
privately and correctly contribute her profile to U ’s LCP.
LCPGen(U(Ci−1), Ui()): : Let Ci−1 be the encrypted
counters after U1, .., Ui−1 have completed the protocol with
U . U sends Ci−1 to Ui. Ui runs the following:
• Generate random values (v1, v′1), .., (vb, v′b). Let j be the
index of the range where Ui fits on dimension D.
• Compute the new encrypted counter set Ci as: Ci =
{RE(vl, v′l, Ci−1[l])Ri mod n|l = 1..b, l 6= j} ∪
RE(vj , v
′
j , Ci−1[j] + +)Ri mod n} and send it to U .
• Engage in a ZK-CTR protocol to prove that Ci ∈ C¯i−1.
The only modification to the ZK-CTR protocol is that all re-
encrypted values are also multiplied with Ri mod n, Ui’s share
of the public value R. If the proof verifies, U replaces Ci−1
with Ci.
After completing LCPGen with U1, .., Uk, U ’s encrypted
counter set is Ck = {Ej = E(uj , u′j , cj, j)R1..Rk|j = 1..d},
where uj and u′j are the product of the obfuscation factors used
by U1, .., Uk in their re-encryptions. The following protocol
enables U to retrieve the snapshot LCP.
PubStats(U(Ck)): : Compute EjK , ∀j = 1..d, where
K = R−1 mod n (R = R1..Rk), decrypt the outcome using
the private key (p, q) and publish the resulting counter value.
Even though U has the private key allowing it to decrypt any
Benaloh ciphertext, the use of the secret Ri values prevents it
from learning the profile of Ui, i = 1..k.
V. ISAFE: CONTEXT AWARE SAFETY
We introduce iSafe, an application built on PROFILR .
iSafe uses the context of users, in terms of their location,
time, other people present, to build a safety representation.
Quantifying the safety of a user based on her current context
can be further used to provide safe walking directions and
context-aware smartphone authentication protocols (i.e., more
complex authentication protocols in unsafe locations). iSafe
combines information collected from Yelp with Census [23]
and historical crime databases as well as context collected by
the users’ mobile devices. We have access to the Miami-Dade
8county [24] area crime and Census datasets since 2007. Each
record in the crime dataset is labeled with a crime type (e.g.,
homicide, larceny, robbery) as well as the geographic location
and time of occurrence.
iSafe assigns static safety labels to Census-defined geo-
graphic blocks. While beyond the scope here, we note that the
safety index is inversely proportional to the weighted average
of the crimes committed in the block. Figure 3 shows the color-
coded safety index for each block group in the Miami-Dade
county (FL) in 2010. iSafe uses the static block safety indexes
to compute safety labels of mobile users. The safety label of a
user is an average over the safety indexes of the blocks visited
by the user. Blocks visited more frequently, have an inherently
higher impact on the user’s safety label. Block and user safety
labels take values in the [0, 1] interval; 1 is the safest label.
iSafe uses PROFILR to privately compute the safety labels
for Yelp venues: the distribution of safety indexes of users that
reviewed them. To achieve this, iSafe divides the [0, 1] safety
range into a discrete set of disjoint sub-intervals, and assigns a
counter to each sub-interval. Each venue privately retrieves the
distribution of the safety values of its reviewers (the counters
of users fitting the corresponding sub-intervals). Finally, the
safety index of the venue is the weighted average of the
aggregated counts. The normalized weights are either the
upper bound value or the middle point of their corresponding
sub-intervals.
Besides this venue-centric approach, iSafe also uses snap-
shot PROFILR to privately aggregate the safety labels of co-
located user devices and distributively obtain the real-time
image of the safety of their location.
A. Implementation
We implemented iSafe as a (i) web server, (ii) a browser
plugin running in the user’s browser and (iii) a mobile ap-
plication. We use Apache Tomcat 6.0.35 to route requests
(exposed to the client through a REST API interface) to our
server-side component. The server-side component relies on
the latest servlet v3.0 which offers additional features includ-
ing asynchronous support, making the server-side processing
much more efficient. We implemented the browser plugin for
the Chrome browser using HTML, CSS and Javascript. The
plugin interacts with Yelp pages and the web server, using
content scripts (Chrome specific components that let us access
the browser’s native API) and cross-origin XMLHttpRequests.
The browser plugin becomes active when the user navigates
to a Yelp page. For user and venue pages, the plugin parses
their HTML file and retrieves their reviews. We employ a
stateful approach, where the server’s DB stores all reviews
of pages previously accessed by users. This enables significant
time savings, as the plugin needs to send to the web server only
reviews written after the date of the last user’s access to the
page. Given the venue’s set of reviews, the server determines
the corresponding reviewers. Since we do not have access
to the location history of users, to compute a user’s security
label we rely on the venues reviewed by the user: The user
safety is computed as an average over the safety labels of
Fig. 4. Snapshot of iSafe’s plugin functionality for a Yelp venue. The orange
circle indicates the venue’s safety level.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Snapshots of iSafe on Android.
the blocks containing the venues reviewed by the user. Given
the safety labels of reviewers, we run PROFILR to determine
their distribution and identify the safety level of the venue.
The server sends back the safety level of the venue, which
the plugin displays in the browser. Figure 4 shows iSafe’s
extension to the Yelp page of the venue “Top Value Trading
Inc.” in Hialeah, FL (central left yellow rectangle containing
iSafe’s safety recommendations).
We have also implemented an Android front-end for
iSafe’s snapshot LCPs. We used the standard Java security
library to implement the cryptographic primitives employed
by PROFILR . For secret sharing, we used Shamir’s scheme
and for digital signatures we used RSA. We also used the
kSOAP2 library to enable SOAP functionality on the Android
app. Figure 5 shows a snapshot of the iSafe Android app on a
Samsung Admire smartphone. We used the Google map API to
facilitate the location based service employed by our approach.
VI. EVALUATION
For testing purposes we have used Samsung Admire smart-
phones running Android OS Gingerbread 2.3 with a 800MHz
CPU and a Dell laptop equipped with a 2.4GHz Intel Core
i5 processor and 4GB of RAM for the server. For local con-
nectivity the devices used their 802.11b/g Wi-Fi interfaces. All
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reported values are averages taken over at least 10 independent
protocol runs.
iSafe: Figure 6(a) shows the overhead of the iSafe plugin when
collecting the reviews of a venue browsed by the user, as a
function of the number of reviews the venue has. It includes
the cost to request each review page, parse and process the
data for transfer. The experiments were performed on the Dell
laptop. It exhibits a sub-linear dependence on the number of
reviews of the venue (under 1s for 10 reviews but under 30s
for 4000 reviews), showing that Yelp’s delay for successive
requests decreases. While even for 500 reviews the overhead
is less than 5s, we note that this cost is incurred only once per
venue. Subsequent accesses to the same venue, by any other
user will no longer incur this overhead.
Spoter’s wormhole defenses: Wormhole attacks are best
detected through timing analysis. We have tested Spoter using
a smartphone connected over ad hoc Wi-Fi to the laptop. The
round-trip Wi-Fi latency is under 3ms. On the Android device,
the time required to compute a (SHA-512) hash is 0.6ms. The
overhead imposed by Spoter on a wormhole attack is the
Wi-Fi round-trip latency, plus the hash time (0.003ms on the
laptop operations), plus the wired round-trip communication
latency. The one-way communication overhead between the
two attackers, if performed over the wired network, is at least
19ms (we tested with systems in Miami, San Francisco and
Chicago). In total, Spoter imposes an overhead on a wormhole
attack (43ms) that is almost 12 times the overhead imposed
on an honest user (3.6ms). Thus, wormhole attacks are easily
detectable in Spoter.
A. PROFILR Evaluation
We have first measured the overhead of the Setup operation.
We set the number of ranges of the domain D to be 5, Shamir’s
TSS group size to 1024 bits and RSA’s modulus size to 1024
bits. Figure 6(b) shows the Setup overhead on the smartphone
and laptop platforms, when the Benaloh modulus size ranges
from 64 to 2048 bits. Note that even a resource constrained
smartphone takes only 2.2s for 1024 bit sizes (0.9s on a
laptop). A marked increase can be noticed for the smartphone
when the Benaloh bit size is 2048 bit long - 13.5s. We note
however that this cost is amortized over multiple check-in runs.
We now focus on the most resource consuming component
of PROFILR : the ZK-CTR protocol. We measure the client
and venue (SPOTRV ) computation overhead as well as their
communication overhead. We set the number of sub-ranges
of domain D to 5. We tested the client side running on
the smartphone and the venue component executing on the
laptop. Figure 7(a) shows the dependence of the three costs
for a single round of ZK-CTR on the Benaloh modulus size.
Given the more efficient venue component and the superior
computation capabilities of the laptop, the venue component
has a much smaller overhead. The communication overhead is
the smallest, exhibiting a linear increase with bit size. For a
Benaloh key size of 1024 bits, the average end-to-end overhead
of a single ZK-CTR round is 135ms. The venue component
is 29ms and the client component is 106ms. Furthermore,
Figure 7(b) shows the overheads of these components as a
function of the number of ZK-CTR rounds, when the Benaloh
key size is 1024 bit long. For 30 rounds, when a cheating
client’s probability of success is 2−30, the total overhead is
3.6s.
We further examine the communication overhead in terms of
bits transferred during ZK-CTR between a client and a venue.
Let N be the Benaloh modulus size and B the sub-range count
of domain D. The communication overhead in a single ZK-
CTR round is 4BN + 3BN = 7BN . The second component
of the sum is due to the average outcome of the challenge
bit. Figure 6(c) shows the dependency of the communication
overhead (in KB) on B, when N = 1024. Even when
B = 20, the communication overhead is around 17KB.
Figure 6(c) shows also the storage overhead (at a venue).
The storage overhead is only a fraction of the (single round)
communication overhead, 2BN . For a single dimension, with
20 sub-ranges, the overhead is 5KB.
VII. RELATED WORK
Golle et al. [25] proposed techniques allowing pollsters to
collect user data while ensuring the privacy of the users. The
privacy is proved at “runtime”: if the pollster leaks private
data, it will be exposed probabilistically. Our work also allow
entities to collect private user data, however, the collectors are
never allowed direct access to private user data.
Toubiana et. al [26] proposed Adnostic, a privacy preserving
ad targeting architecture. Users have a profile that allows the
private matching of relevant ads. While PROFILR can be used
to privately provide location centric targeted ads, its main goal
is different - to compute location (venue) centric profiles that
preserve the privacy of contributing users.
Manweiler et al. [27] proposed SMILE, a privacy-preserving
“missed-connections” service similar to Craigslist, where the
service provider is untrusted and users do not have existing
relationships. The solution is distributed, allowing users to
anonymously prove to each other the existence of a past
encounter. While we have a similar setup, our work addresses a
different problem, of privately collecting location centric user
profile aggregates.
Location and temporal cloaking techniques, or introducing
errors in reported locations in order to provide 1-out-of-k
anonymity have been initially proposed in [28], followed by
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a significant body of work [29], [30], [31], [32]. We note
that PROFILR provides an orthogonal notion of k-anonymity:
instead of reporting intervals containing k other users, we
allow the construction of location centric profiles only when
k users have reported their location. Computed LCPs hide the
profiles the users: user profiles are anonymous, only aggregates
are available for inspection, and interactions with venues and
the provider are indistinguishable.
Our work relies on the assumption that participants cannot
control a large number of fake, Sybil accounts. One way to en-
sure this property is to use existing Sybil detection techniques.
Danezis and Mittal [33] proposed a centralized SybilInfer
solution based in Bayesian inference. Yu et al. proposed
distributed solutions, SybilGuard [34] and SybilLimit [35],
that use online social networks to protect peer-to-peer network
against Sybil nodes. They rely on the fast mixing property of
social networks and the limited connectivity of Sybil nodes to
non-Sybil nodes.
Significant work has been done recently to preserve the
privacy of users from the online social network provider.
Cutillo et al. [36] proposed Safebook, a distributed online
social networks where insiders are protected from external
observers through the inherent flow of information in the
system. Tootoonchian et al. [37] proposed Lockr, a system for
improving the privacy of social networks. It achieves this by
using the concept of a social attestation, which is a credential
proving a social relationship. Baden et al. [38] introduced
Persona, a distributed social network with distributed account
data storage. Sun et al. [39] proposed a similar solution,
extended with revocation capabilities through the use of broad-
cast encryption. While we rely on distributed online social
networks, our goal is to protect the privacy of users while
also allowing venues to collect certain user statistics.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed (i) novel mechanisms for building ag-
gregate location-centric profiles while maintaining the privacy
of participating users and ensuring their honesty during the
process and (ii) centralized and distributed, real-time variants
of the solution, along with applications that can benefit from
the construction of such profiles. We have shown that our solu-
tions are efficient, even when executed on resource constrained
mobile devices.
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